The Common Scrambling Algorithm (CSA) is used to encrypt streams of video data in the Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) system. The algorithm cascades a stream and a block cipher, apparently for a larger security margin. In this paper we set out to analyze the block cipher and the stream cipher separately and give an overview of how they interact with each other. We present a practical attack on the stream cipher. Research on the block cipher so far indicates it to be resistant against linear and algebraic cryptanalysis as well as simple slide attacks.
Introduction
The DVB Common Scrambling Algorithm is an ETSI-specified algorithm for securing MPEG-2 transport streams such as those used for digitally transmitted Pay-TV. It was adopted by the DVB consortium in May 1994, the exact origin and date of the design is unclear. Until 2002, the algorithm was only available under a Non-Disclosure Agreement from an ETSI custodian. This NDA disallowed and still disallows licensees to implement the algorithm in software for "security reasons". The little information that was then available to the public is contained in an ETSI Technical Report [Eur96] and patent applications [Bew98] , [WAJ98] . This changed in the Fall of 2002, when a Windows program called FreeDec appeared which implemented the CSA in software. It was quickly reverse-engineered and details were disseminated on a web site [Pse03] .
For keying the CSA, so called control words are used. These control words are provided by a conditional access mechanism, which generates them from encrypted control messages embedded in the transport stream. Conditional access mechanisms vary between broadcasters and can be more easily changed than the actual scrambling algorithm. Examples for commonly used conditional access mechanisms are Irdeto, Betacrypt, Nagravision, CryptoWorks etc. A new common key is usually issued every 10-120 seconds. The great relevance of CSA lies in the fact that every encrypted digital Pay-TV transmission in Europe is secured using this algorithm. A practical break of CSA would thus affect all broadcasters and could not be remedied by changing the conditional access mechanism.
The scrambling algorithm can be seen as the layering of two cryptographic primitives: a 64-bit block cipher and a stream cipher. Both ciphers employ a common key; the stream cipher uses an additional 64-bit nonce, the origin of which we will discuss later.
In this paper we investigate the two ciphers independently and show weaknesses. Although we do not present a break of the scrambling algorithm we present a known-plaintext attack on the stream cipher and show preliminary results on the block cipher.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 defines the notation used. In Section 3 we describe the two ciphers and how they are combined in the CSA. Our attack on the stream cipher as well as a presentation of properties of the block cipher follow in Sections 4 respectively 5. Section 6 concludes.
Definitions
In the rest of this paper we use the following notation: K the common key. A 64 bit key used for both the stream and the block cipher k i denotes the i-th bit of K K E denotes the expanded key which is derived through the key schedule of the block cipher SB i is the i-th 8-byte block of the scrambled data stream SB 0 is used as nonce in the stream cipher CB i is the i-th 8-byte block of stream cipher output IB i intermediate blocks. See Figure 1 for details. DB i is the i-th 8-byte block of descrambled data R denotes the residue and SR is used for the scrambled residue IV an initialization vector. Always equals the zero block. rol bitwise rotation to the left by one bit || denotes concatenation t i state of the stream cipher after i clocks t −31 is the starting state, t 0 the state after the initialization I A is an additional input for the stream cipher generated from the nonce l w denotes the cycle length, i.e. the smallest number j − i for which t j = t i l s is the length of a small cycle, i.e. the smallest number j − i for which the feedback shift register 1 has the same value in t j and t i 3 Description
Cascading the block and the stream cipher
The scrambling algorithm can be seen as a cascade of a block cipher and a stream cipher. Both ciphers use the same 64-bit key K, which is called the common key. We will now describe how the block and the stream cipher are combined. Figure 1 depicts the descrambling process. For scrambling the payload of a m-byte packet, it is divided into blocks (DB i ) of 8 bytes each. If an adaption field was used, it is possible that the length of the packet is not a multiple of 8 bytes. Thus the last block is n < 8 bytes long and shall be called residue.
The sequence of 8-byte blocks is encrypted in reverse order with the block cipher in CBC mode, whereas the residue is left untouched. The last output of the chain IB 0 is then used as a nonce for the stream cipher. The first m − 8 bytes of keystream generated by the stream cipher are XORed to the encrypted blocks (IB i ) i≥1 followed by the residue.
The stream cipher

Overview
The stream cipher is built of two feedback-shift-registers and a combiner with memory. The overall layout is shown in Figure 2 . The registers p, q and c are bit registers. All other registers are 4 bit wide.
The stream cipher operates in one of two modes. The first one is the initialization mode in which the starting state of the cipher is set up. The second one is the generating mode in which the cipher produces two pseudo-random bits per clock cycle.
Key Schedule
The cipher uses the common key K and the first scrambled block of the transport stream SB 0 as a nonce to set up the initial state. At first all registers of the cipher are set to 0. Then the common key K = k 0 , . . . , k 63 is loaded into the shift registers A := a 0,j , . . . , a 9,j and B := b 0,j , . . . , b 9,j with 0 ≤ j ≤ 3 according to the following rule: Hereafter the cipher is in initialization mode. It uses SB 0 and the feedback register D as input and performs 32 clock cycles to calculate the starting state. The inputs for feedback shift registers 1 and 2 are derived from SB 0 :
Thus in every odd cycle number I A is the high nibble of SB 0 whereas I B is the low nibble. In even cycles the nibbles are used the other way round. See below for the equations which update the internal cipher state.
Generation mode
Feedback shift register 1 The feedback a 0 of shift register A is calculated as
The next value A for register A is then given by
Feedback shift register 2 The feedback b 0 of shift register B is given by
and the new value B for B is
Other registers New values for the other registers, namely X, Y , Z, p and q are derived from seven 5 × 2 S-Boxes. Table 1 shows which bits from shiftregister A are used as input for the S-Boxes and how the new register values are constructed. The S-Boxes itself are shown in Table 4 . Table 6 gives an algebraic description of the S-Boxes, with a being the most significant input bit and e the least significant.
Combiner The stream cipher uses a combiner with memory to calculate two bits of output per clock. The memory of the combiner consists of registers E, F and c. In each cycle a new state for these registers is determined according to
c is unchanged if q = 0. Otherwise it is 1 if E + Z + c ≥ 2 4 and 0 else.
The output of the generator is calculated by
out with B out given by
Table 1: S-Box input and generation of new register values. S 1 a 3,0 a 0,2 a 5,1 a 6,3 a 8,0 S 2 a 1,1 a 2,2 a 5,3 a 6,0 a 8,1 S 3 a 0,3 a 1,0 a 4,1 a 4,3 a 5,2 S 4 a 2,3 a 0,1 a 1,3 a 3,2 a 7,0 S 5 a 4,2 a 3,2 a 5,0 a 7,1 a 8,2 S 6 a 2,1 a 3,1 a 4,0 a 6,2 a 8,3 S 7 a 1,2 a 2,0 a 6,1 a 7,2 a 7,3
The block cipher
CSA employs an iterated block cipher that operates bytewise on 64-bit blocks of data and uses a 64-bit key, the common key K. Each round of the cipher employs the same round transformation φ, which takes an 8-byte vector along with a single byte of the expanded key as input and outputs an 8-byte vector. This round transformation is applied 56 times. One could also lump together 8 successive rounds of the cipher into a round function φ and describe a 7-round cipher which uses 64-bit subkeys; however we feel that the description we give below is more natural and easier to comprehend.
The key schedule
Let ρ be the bit permutation on 64-bit strings which is defined in Table 2 . The expanded key
consists of a total of 448 bits which are recursively computed as follows:
where the expression 0x0i0i0i0i0i0i0i0i is to be interpreted as a hexadecimal constant. We note that the key schedule is entirely GF (2)-linear.
The round function
At the core of the round transformation φ are the nonlinear functions f and f . These are distinct permutations on the set of all byte values and can be seen as the S-Boxes of the cipher. Both permutations have maximum cycle length and are related to each other by a bit permutation σ, i.e. f = σ • f . This bit permutation maps bit 0 to 1, bit 1 to 7, bit 2 to 5, bit 3 to 4, bit 4 to 2, bit 5 to 6, bit 6 to 0 and bit 7 to 3. See Table 5 for the actual values described by f .
Let S = (s 0 , . . . , s 7 ) be the vector of bytes representing the internal state of the block cipher in an arbitrary round. The function φ taking the internal state S from round i to round i + 1 can then be defined as 
Encryption/Decryption
Encrypting a plaintext P = (p 0 , . . . , p 7 ) is accomplished by
which yields the ciphertext C = (c 0 , . . . , c 7 ). For decrypting this ciphertext the following sequence of operations needs to be carried out:
Analysis of the stream cipher
In the following we denote with t 0 the stream cipher's state after the initialization. That means t −31 is the initial state, in which the common key is loaded in the registers A and B respectively. Given this notation we define a full cycle to be the smallest number l w := j − i for which the values of all registers in state t i are equal to the values in t j . Also we define a small cycle to be the smallest number l s := j − i when the values of X and A in state t i are equal to the values in t j .
Observation
The CSA stream cipher's state consists of 103 bits. This means that the maximum period length is 2 103 . For cryptographic purposes, one would expect the cycle to go through a minimum of 2 80 states. Using Floyd's cycle-finding algorithm however, we observed that after a relatively short preperiod there exist only a few different cycle lengths for different key/nonce combinations; all of these have a length of l w < 10 9 , which of course is much smaller than 2 80 . When comparing the set of states in several cycles with the same length which where generated by different key/nonce pairs, one notices that these are disjunct; many different cycles with length l w exist.
On the other hand, taking only A and X in account shows that if two cycles have the same length l w then l s is equal too. Moreover the sequence of states in feedback-shift-register 1 is equal. This means that if l w is equal for two cycles then the registers A and X for these cycles are going through the same values.
We conducted a total of 10 5 experiments with random key/nonce pairs to determine the most probable period lengths for the state transition function operating on register A. Table 3 shows some small cycle lengths l s together with the number of times n(l s ) we observed a cycle of this length in our test and a(l s ) the average length of the pre-period for a given cycle length. 
Finding the correct value for FSR1
The trivial method of finding the correct value for FSR1 is to simply try all possible values. That means that one searches through all states which belong to one of the small cycles. Summing up the number of states in Table 3 shows that in 98.4% of all cases testing 313, 169 possibilities is sufficient; this is far less than the 2 44 possible values for A and X.
Reconstructing the remaining registers
The stream cipher's output is calculated by XORing Z, E and B out . Since we can now consider A to be known, Z is fully determined. For all possible 2 9 values of E, F and c do the following: Consider all bits of B at clock cycle t as variables with values in GF (2). Generate a system of equations describing the two output bits at clock cycle t + k as linear equations of bits of these variables. This system is linear since the additional inputs for the feedback shift register are fully determined by A and hence are known. In other words: for every state of A a system of linear equations that fully describes B with respect to B out exists. Therefore this system can be efficiently solved using Gaussian elimination. If the system is inconsistent then the guess for E, F and c was wrong and has to be altered.
The last step of the attack is to determine which of the possible solutions for the linear equations system is the correct one. This has to be done because different values for E, F and c may lead to a solution of the system. The correct value can be determined simply by running the keystream generator with the calculated state and checking if the output corresponds to the actual output of the generator.
Results
Some of the generated equations are linearly dependent. Experimentally we derived that for finding a unique solution to the system described above, 60 equations are sufficient.
For carrying out the attack one thus needs to solve approximately 2 19 · 2 9 = 2 28 systems of linear equations, each of which contains 60 equations in 40 unknowns. Experiments showed that this can be done in less than an hour on a 1.25 GHz PowerPC G4. We stress that our attack leaves much room for improvement. It might be possible to increase our chances at guessing the correct value for A from statistical deviation in the output of the stream cipher. But already our unoptimized version shows that the stream cipher can be broken in a very short time. Also, this attack is well suited to parallelization.
Analysis of the block cipher
We note that the round function φ is a weak permutation. Given the inputs x 1 , x 2 and outputs y 1 = φ(x 1 , k) and y 2 = φ(x 2 , k) of a single round it is trivial to determine the round subkey k. The key schedule however seems to make the cipher resistant against slide attacks [BW99] .
Linear approximation of the S-Boxes
The maximum bias of both S-Boxes is 17 128 . Trying to find a linear path through several rounds of the cipher we see that the number of active S-Boxes in the path increases exponentially in the number of rounds. Because of this fact and the high number of rounds, the authors believe that classical linear cryptanalysis poses not threat to the cipher.
Polynomial interpolation of the S-Boxes
We have interpolated the S-Boxes as polynomials over fields GF (2
for all m ∈ GF (2)[X] with deg(m) = 8 and m irreducible. The resulting polynomials are all dense and of maximum degree. Interpolating bit traces of the S-Boxes results in polynomials consisting of 117-137 terms. Two of them are of degree 8, the other 6 of degree 7. Thus we conclude that both representations are not useful for algebraic cryptanalysis of the cipher.
Conclusion
In this paper we described the Common Scrambling Algorithm and presented an analysis of the underlying stream and block cipher parts. We showed that the stream cipher is weak and can be efficiently broken. We also pointed out some properties of the block cipher which eventually could be used in an successful attack. However, since the block cipher uses 56 rounds we believe that such an attack would have to use sophisticated techniques.
Cryptanalyzing both stream and block cipher at the same time seems to be a task too daunting to attempt. Finding special cases where plaintext and corresponding ciphertext can be obtained that is encrypted with only one of the ciphers facilitates easier cryptanalysis. For the stream cipher these are packets with a residue. A sufficiently long adaption field on the other hand can lead to packets which are only protected by the block cipher.
We believe that extending the attack on the stream cipher to a key recovery is not a trivial task. Since the state update function of the stream cipher is irreversible and nonlinear, the only option we see at this point for recovering the key is to solve a large system of polynomial equations for different nonces and key streams. The nonlinear equations in this system are of the form seen in Table 6 .
There are various directions for future research on these topics. First of all the attack presented offers room for further improvements like the reduction of the necessary register guesses. Investigating how to recover the Common Key K from a known state of the stream cipher is another logical step. Finally, the block cipher needs more scrutiny. Input S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 00000 10 11 10 11 10 00 00 00001 00 01 00 01 00 01 11 00010 01 00 01 10 00 10 10 00011 01 10 10 11 01 11 10 00100 10 10 10 00 11 01 11 00101 11 11 11 10 10 10 00 00110 11 11 11 01 11 10 00 00111 00 00 01 10 10 00 01 01000 11 01 01 01 00 00 11 01001 10 11 01 10 01 01 00 01010 10 10 00 00 11 11 01 01011 00 01 11 01 11 00 11 01100 01 00 11 11 01 10 01 01101 01 00 00 00 00 11 10 01110 00 01 10 00 10 01 10 01111 11 10 00 11 01 11 01
Appendix
Input S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 10000 00 11 01 01 10 10 01 10001 11 01 11 00 11 11 00 10010 11 00 00 11 10 00 11 10011 00 11 01 01 00 10 11 10100 10 11 11 10 00 11 00 10101 10 10 00 11 11 00 01 10110 01 00 10 00 01 01 01 10111 01 10 10 11 01 01 10 11000 10 00 10 00 01 10 10 11001 10 00 00 11 00 01 11 11010 00 01 01 10 11 01 01 11011 11 10 10 00 10 10 00 11100 01 10 00 01 11 00 10 11101 01 01 11 10 01 11 11 11110 11 11 11 10 00 11 00 11111 00 01 01 01 10 00 10 Table 5 : S-Box of the block cipher. Output arranged row-wise; lower nibble on horizonal, upper on vertical. 0x00 0x01 0x02 0x03 0x04 0x05 0x06 0x07 0x08 0x09 0x0A 0x0B 0x0C 0x0D 0x0E 0x0F 0x00 0x3A 0xEA 0x68 0xFE 0x33 0xE9 0x88 0x1A 0x83 0xCF 0xE1 0x7F 0xBA 0xE2 0x38 0x12 0x01 0xE8 0x27 0x61 0x95 0x0C 0x36 0xE5 0x70 0xA2 0x06 0x82 0x7C 0x17 0xA3 0x26 0x49 0x02 0xBE 0x7A 0x6D 0x47 0xC1 0x51 0x8F 0xF3 0xCC 0x5B 0x67 0xBD 0xCD 0x18 0x08 0xC9 0x03 0xFF 0x69 0xEF 0x03 0x4E 0x48 0x4A 0x84 0x3F 0xB4 0x10 0x04 0xDC 0xF5 0x5C 0xC6 0x04 0x16 0xAB 0xAC 0x4C 0xF1 0x6A 0x2F 0x3C 0x3B 0xD4 0xD5 0x94 0xD0 0xC4 0x63 0x62 0x05 0x71 0xA1 0xF9 0x4F 0x2E 0xAA 0xC5 0x56 0xE3 0x39 0x93 0xCE 0x65 0x64 0xE4 0x58 0x06 0x6C 0x19 0x42 0x79 0xDD 0xEE 0x96 0xF6 0x8A 0xEC 0x1E 0x85 0x53 0x45 0xDE 0xBB 0x07 0x7E 0x0A 0x9A 0x13 0x2A 0x9D 0xC2 0x5E 0x5A 0x1F 0x32 0x35 0x9C 0xA8 0x73 0x30 0x08 0x29 0x3D 0xE7 0x92 0x87 0x1B 0x2B 0x4B 0xA5 0x57 0x97 0x40 0x15 0xE6 0xBC 0x0E 0x09 0xEB 0xC3 0x34 0x2D 0xB8 0x44 0x25 0xA4 0x1C 0xC7 0x23 0xED 0x90 0x6E 0x50 0x00 0x0A 0x99 0x9E 0x4D 0xD9 0xDA 0x8D 0x6F 0x5F 0x3E 0xD7 0x21 0x74 0x86 0xDF 0x6B 0x05 0x0B 0x8E 0x5D 0x37 0x11 0xD2 0x28 0x75 0xD6 0xA7 0x77 0x24 0xBF 0xF0 0xB0 0x02 0xB7 0x0C 0xF8 0xFC 0x81 0x09 0xB1 0x01 0x76 0x91 0x7D 0x0F 0xC8 0xA0 0xF2 0xCB 0x78 0x60 0x0D 0xD1 0xF7 0xE0 0xB5 0x98 0x22 0xB3 0x20 0x1D 0xA6 0xDB 0x7B 0x59 0x9F 0xAE 0x31 0x0E 0xFB 0xD3 0xB6 0xCA 0x43 0x72 0x07 0xF4 0xD8 0x41 0x14 0x55 0x0D 0x54 0x8B 0xB9 0x0F 0xAD 0x46 0x0B 0xAF 0x80 0x52 0x2C 0xFA 0x8C 0x89 0x66 0xFD 0xB2 0xA9 0x9B 0xC0 Table 6 : Algebraic description of the S-Boxes used in the stream cipher. S 4,1 = abcd + abde + acde + abc + abe + bcd + cde + ad + ab + ae + de + a + b + c + e + 1 S 5,0 = abde + acde + acd + abe + abd + ace + bce + cde + ab + ac + ae + bd + be + ce + de + c S 5,1 = abcd + abce + acde + abd + abe + acd + bcd + bce + bde + cde + ac + ad + ae + be + cd + ce + de + b + d + e + 1 S 6,0 = abcd + abde + acde + acd + ade + bcd + cde + bc + bd + cd + c + e S 6,1 = abe + ade + bce + bde + bc + ce + a + d S 7,0 = abde + abd + cde + bc + cd + de + a + b + c + e S 7,1 = abcd + abdebc + acde + acd + ade + bde + ac + ae + de + b + c + d + e
